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NOTES.
MONOPOLIES AND COMBINATIONS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.

A case recently decided in the United States Circuit Court
for the Northern District of Ohio' presents for consideration
several principles, which are of growing interest, in view of the
present day anti-trust agitation.
The offending party being in this instance a telephone company, the question arose as to whether it was justified in making
an exclusive lease for the period of 99 years, whereby certain local companies agreed to give all their long distance
work to this particular company. In this respect it had been
held that exclusive contracts in favor of express companies
by a railroad were not against public policy ;2 also, that a contract whereby the Pullman Car Co. were to furnish exclu-

sively all Pullman cars to a railroad was not in violation of
IU. S. Telephone Co. v. Cent. Union Tel. Co. et al., 171 Fed. 13o.
'Express Cases, 117 U. S. I (1885).
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public policy.8 Was an exclusive contract by a long distance
telephone company to be put in any different class?
In the case of express companies the decision went upon the
ground that the express business had to be carried out on
passenger trains where, owing to the unavoidably limited space,
and the necessity of having the agent of each express company
present and in charge of the goods, it would cause endless
delay and confusion, if it were necessary for a railroad to
divide up such space among any and all express companies
who chose to demand such accommodation. It is clear that
such reasoning could not apply to a telephone company, in its
endeavor to prevent local companies from using the long distance lines of competing companies.
As for the exclusive contract with the Pullman Company, it
was said that who furnished the Pullman cars was of no concern to the general public, so long as they were furnished, and
were allowed to be transferred over any lines in the country.
It is submitted that the real distinction between both the above
cases, (i. e., express companies and Pullman companies) and
the case of the present telephone company, is that a contract
which affects only the quality of the service-and that not
unreasonably-will not be deemed to be against public policy,
whereas a contract which limits the scope of the service, is in
violation of the duties of such companies to the public. Therefore, had the contract been to supply the telephone company
exclusively with a certain kind of transmitter or receiver, it
could hardly have been held an illegal or monopolistic contract,
whereas had the contract of the Pullman Company been that
no Pullman cars should be furnished or sent beyond certain
points, it might well have violated the duties owed the public.
Another point of interest is whether or not under any view
the local companies could be compelled to give their patrons
long distance service if available; for if no such duty was
owed the patrons, it was to be contended that no duty could
be violated by entering into a voluntary contract by which the
patrons were benefited. As the determination of such a question is necessarily limited to recent times, the decisions are
not yet numerous, but it would seem to be solved as follows:
The long distance company owed the duty of rendering long
distance service to its patrons. By entering into an agreement of consolidation with the local companies, as in the present case, it assumed the duties of the local companies and vice
versa;4 or, as a modern text-writer has put it: "The liability
"Railroad Co. v. Pullman Co., 139 U. S. 79 (890).
'Tomlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall. 465 (1872); Mobile v. State, 41 So.
Rep. 259 (19o6).
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of a consolidated company upon the contracts of its constitu-5
ents is precisely the same as that of the original company."
Therefore, after having united with a long distance company,
the local companies owed to their patrons the duty of providing them with long distance service.
Assuming, then, that it became the duty of the company to
furnish to its patrons long distance service, the question remains: was the contract here entered into monopolistic and
against public policy?
The contract was in the form of a 99 year lease, containing
the exclusive restrictions before adverted to. It has been held
that a lease may come within the provisions of a statute against
"consolidation," though such a conclusion would seem to be
stretching the interpretation of the word "consolidate." Accordingly, some courts have not accepted this view.7 Under
the Ohio statutes, however, the word "lease" has been specifically used, and there could be no doubt that a lease could be
in violation of the public policy of Ohio. The question remained whether this particular lease was of that nature. The
Court for this purpose treated the. telephone company as a9
common carrier 8 and is supported in this view by authority
and many dicta, but it would seem impossible on theory to
establish the essential relationship of bailor and bailee in the
case of a telephone company. While it has been advanced that
a telegraph company is a bailee of the message or of "intelligence," '10 yet such reasoning can hardly apply to a telephone
company, for the sender personally transfers his own message
and delivers it himself, the company merely furnishing a
method or means for such transportation. It could not be contended that the owner of a megaphone who offered it for public
use in summoning conveyances, for example, could be liable as
common carrier, and yet the case appears analogous. The better
view, moreover, is that telephone and even telegraph companies
are not to be correctly termed "common carriers."' 1 Yet it is
universally admitted that they occupy a position closely analo'Noyes on Intercorporate Relations, p. 158.
'State v. Atchison R. Co., 24 Neb. 164 (i888).
'Gere v.N. Y.C. R. Co., 1g Abb. N. C. 210 (1885).
'P. 146.
'State v. Cadwallader,87 N. E.644 (io9); Telegraph Co. v. Texas,
,05 U. S. 460 (1881).
" Chesapeake v. Co., 66 Md. 399 (1886).
v. Tel. Co., 41 N. Y. 544 (187o); Hibbard v. Tel. Co., 33
Wis.'Leonard
s58 01873).
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gous to that of common carriers with respect to their duties to

the public.' 2
Then, reverting to the text submitted above, the lease for 99
years would here appear to be clearly against public policy, for
the scope of the service was thereby materially limited, since the
contracting company could not furnish the local companies with
the connections which they could secure by supplementary contracts with other long distance companies. Such conclusion
is supported by numerous authorities.'8
The whoM question arose in an unusual way, which is worthy
of notice. The complainart company asked for an injunction
to restrain the respondent company from interfering with this
99 year lease of complainant's, and from effecting breaches of
this contract by the local companies. The relief was sought
on the basis of the old doctrine of Lumley v. Gye.ll The Court,
however, held that in issuing an injunction to prevent a breach
of contract, it necessarily devolved upon the Court to inquire
into the legality of the contract which was to be thus negatively enforced. Then, turning the tables on the complainant,
they held that it had made a contract in violation of public
policy and statute law, and was therefore entitled to no relief
on such contract.
The whole matter being -an equitable proceeding the Court
was entitled to look both at the respondent's wrong, and at
the standing of the complainant, and it was justified in refusing
aid not only for the reason just given above, but on account
of the old equitable maxim that "he who comes into equity
must come with clean hands." This was a case, therefore,
when the "tu quoque" argument proved wholly effective.
W. L. MacC.
ACTION FOR LIBEL WHERE DEFENDANT HAS USED A FICTITIOUS
NAME.

A curious and unusual set of facts has recently presented
to the King's Bench Division a perplexing question in the law
of Libel.'
The Sunday Chronicle published a letter from its Paris correspondent describing a motor festival at Dieppe. In this
"Hutchinson on Carriers, § 8ra.
"State v. Tel. Co., 47 Fed. 633 (1891) ; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
113 (1876) ; Ohio v. Tel. Co., 36 Ohio, 296 (i88o).
1"75 Eng. C. L. R. 216 (1853).
'Jones v. Hulton, L. R. (1gog), ii K. B. D. 444.
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letter the author in describing the crowd iupon the terrace,
wrote: "There is Artemus Jones with a woman who is not his
wife, who must be, you know, the other thing. Who would
suppose by his goings-on that he was a church-warden at Peckham?" The correspondent invented the name "Artemus
Jones" and had no idea of applying his remarks to any particular person. Unfortunately, however, a man bearing the name
of Artemus Jones, who neither lived at Peckham nor was a
church-warden, brought an action against the proprietors of
the Sunday Chronicle,proved that several persons had thought
him to be the Artemus Jones referred to in the letter, and recovered 1750 pounds damages. The three judges who decided
the case on appeal dealt chiefly with this question,--To what extent does the defendant's intention affect the question of liability? Lord Alverstone, C. J., held that the defendant's intention was entirely immaterial; Fletcher-Moulton, L. J., held that
it was crucial; and Farwell, L. J., divided his attention between
the questions of intent and negligence.
The question of intent in libel has been discussed in three
classes of case: (i) Where the defendant intends to publish
a statement concerning the plaintiff, but does not intend it to
be libellous. Here it is usually held that the defendant's intention is immaterial. 2 He has made a statement intending it to
apply to the plaintiff and must take the risk of the consequences
of such a publication; he is in the position of a man who, intending to strike his neighbor's dog in play, inadvertently
strikes it dead.
(2)
Where the defendant, intending to make an innocent
statement concerning the plaintiff, makes a libellous statement
by mistake. Here the same considerations apply. Thus where
defendant, intending to insert plaintiff's name under "Notices of
Dissolution of Partnership," put it by mistake under the heading "First Meetings Under the Bankruptcy Act," the plaintiff
recovered. So, too, where a newspaper in reporting an arrest
inadvertently interchanged the names of prisoner and prosecuting witness, the latter recovered.4 In both classes of case
it is evident that the defendant is entirely innocent of any intent to harm the plaintiff; but it must be observed that the
defendant intends to involve the plaintiff in the act which
he is doing, i. e., he intends to make a statement concerning
the plaintiff.
-Haire v. Wilson, 9 B. & C. 645 (I829).
' Shepheard v. Whitaker, L. R. IO C. P. 502

(1875).

'Griebel v. Rochester Printing Co., 6o Hun, 319 (1891).
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(3) Where the defendant has no idea of making any publication concerning the plaintiff. In this class, in which the
principal case falls, the defendant not only has no intent to
harm the plaintiff, but, having never heard of the plaintiff's
existence, has no intent to do any act in which the plaintiff
shall be involved. Can such a state of mind involve the defendant in liability to any action? Very few cases answer this
question directly and in those cases which discuss the matter,
the confused use of the words "intention" and "meaning" and
the possibility of taking them either subjectively or objectively,
make it difficult to ascertain the true opinion of the court. A
few cases discuss the question of a publisher's liability to a
plaintiff whose name has been innocently used by the publisher in a libellous article, but in most of these it appears
that the defendant intended to level his remarks at some living
person, if not at the plaintiff.5
Smith v. Ashley, 52 Mass. 368, seems to be a direct authority in conflict with the decision of Lord Alverstone and Lord
Farwell. The Court in Smith v. Ashley held that a publisher
was not liable for the publication of an article, though aimed
at the plaintiff by the writer, provided the defendant thought
the article a mere skit and the plaintiff's name a fictitious one.
It is evident that the court was controlled by a theory of tort
liability somewhat different from that which influenced Lords
Alverstone and Farwell. The Court said, "If the defendant
had no knowledge that the article published was libellous, he
has been guilty of no wrong, and he is not responsible by law,
although the plaintiff has thereby been injured." The Court
in the principal case, on the other hand, takes the position that
it is injury to the plaintiff, and not a wrongful act on the part
of the defendant, which constitutes the real basis of liability.
The modern conception of tort involves two ideas, (i) injury
to the plaintiff and (2) the injury is directly due to an omission by the defendant of the performance of a duty due by
him to the plaintiff. In the principal case, injury to the plaintiff is evident; it therefore becomes material to consider only
the second of the above elements. Farwell, L. J., proceeds on
the theory that the defendant was negligent in giving out to the
world a scandalous story which might, by any possibility, injure
a living person. This sets a high standard of the duty of carefulness owed by one man to his neighbors. On the other hand,
in the few cases contra, it is said that a man discharges his
duty to his neighbor in this matter, if he abstain from wilfully
"Harrisonv. Smith, 20 L. T. (N. S.) 713 (Nisi Prius,1869) ; Hanson
v. Globe Newspaper Co., 159 Mass. 293 (1893).
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publishing statements meant by him to apply to one of his
neighbors.6
Where two theories so widely divergent appear each to have
a sound basis in legal philosophy, the criterion of liability must
of necessity be found by an application of the dictates of common sense and convenience. Fletcher-Moulton, L. J., points
out to what absurdities a logical extension of his colleagues'
judgment must lead.7 Since an action of libel will lie although
no name has been used, a public speaker may bring upon himself very serious consequences by innocently introducing a hypothetical case to illustrate a point in his discourse. So a statement true of the John Smith "of and concerning" whom the
defendant wrote, may give to a hundred other John Smiths
a cause of action against the publisher. If it be said that by
ascertaining the truth of his statement with regard to one John
Smith the publisher has thereby discharged his duty of carefulness towards his neighbors, it may well be answered that
this is an arbitrary rule and that, if the severe doctrine be carried out to its logical limits, a publisher should be obliged to
make it plain and unquestionable which of the hundred and
one John Smiths he intended. In the words of Fletcher-Moulton, L. J., "It would indeed be a calamity if our English law
of defamation burdened ordinary speech or writing with such
a chaos of responsibilities." The milder rule seems more in
accord with common sense and convenience than the stringent
rule set forth by the majority of the English Court.
S.L.
FALSE REPRESENTATIONS OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

It seems reasonably clear that an innocent principal is liable
in tort for deceit, if his agent deliberately makes false representations, or makes them in conscious ignorance of their truth or
falsity, while acting within the scope of his authority. The
idea underlying this doctrine appears to be that the principal
cannot employ an agent and retain the benefit of his services
without assuming full responsibility for the frauds of the agent
as well as for his other torts.
A few cases hold that this liability of the principal need
not be based upon the tort of the agent, but may be referred
to the contract, as on a breach of warranty. Thus, where an
agent was authorized to make material and false representa6

1

Every Evening Printing Co. v. Butler, 144 Fed. 916 (igo6).
L. R. (igo9), ii K. B. D. 475.
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tions as to existing facts, which were capable of exact knowledge, even though both principal and agent believed the representations to be true, and those representations induced the
contract, the principal was held liable on the contract for the
damages actually suffered in the case of Wimple et al v. Patterson.1 The court advanced the proposition that in such
cases "the liability of the principal need not be rested upon
the tort, but may be referred to the contract, for whether made
innocently or deceitfully, such representations against the seller
operate as a warranty." The Texas case cited in support of.
this conclusion apparently sustains it,2 but the only outside
authority referred to does hot. 3 All the latter case decides is
that a principal is liable in an action of tort for the fraudulent
misrepresentation of his agent made within the scope of his
authority, which is self-evident. It is submitted that there is a
distinction between permitting an action against the principal
in tort for the fraudulent misrepresentations of his agent, and
allowing an action against the principal on the contract as for
a breach of warranty. A representation is not necessarily a
warranty; the latter is a part of the contract, the former precedes and induces the contract. In case of breach of warranty
the contract remains binding and damages only are recoverable for the breach; whereas upon a false representation, the
defrauded party may rescind the contract and recover as damages the entire price paid. The same transaction cannot be a
warranty and a fraud at the same time, for the one is a part
of the contract, the other is a tort collateral to the contract.
If this is correct, it will be seen that the case cited (Rhoda v.
Annis) is no authority for the conclusion reached in Wimple v.
Patterson.

If the false representations, innocently made, were not authorized by the principal, and were made without his knowledge, but within the apparent scope of the agent's authority,
some cases hold that the principal is not liable, even though he
receives the benefit of the contract.4 See the celebrated case of
Cornfoot v. Fowke5 the agent represented that there was no
objection to a house he was authorized to let, whereas, unS117 S. W. 1034.
'Loper v. Robinson, 54 Tex. 50.
'Rhoda
v. Annis, 75 Me. 17.
' In Deaker v. Fredericks,47 N. J. Law (18 Vroom), 469, the Court
held that the principal is not liable for the false representation of his
special agent where the latter was authorized only to sell the horse as
he stood, without representations or warranties.
'6 M. & W., 358.
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known to him, but known to the principal, there was a brothel
next door. The lessee pleaded the fraud in defense to an action
for rent. The plea was held bad, although it would have been
good if the principal were shown to have intentionally concealed the circumstances from the agent. However, what this
case really decided was that it was error to tell the jury without qualification, "that the representations of the agent must
have the same effect as if made by the principal himself," the
plea averring fraud without qualification.8 This case must be
considered at flatly contra to Wimple v. Patterson,, and is in
accordance with the doctrine in England that to hold the principal liable it is necessary to lay the action with a scienter, and
prove that he was guilty of some intentional concealment of
the facts innocently misrepresented by the agent.7 Therefore,
what would have amounted to fraud had the agent possessed
the knowledge of the principal when he made the misrepresentations is not fraud when the principal knows, but does not
disclose, the real circumstances, which are innocently misrepresented by the agent, without the knowledge of the principal.
This case effectually disposes of the fiction of identity of
principal and agent, advocated by a few writers; and also
seems to repudiate the doctrine that seems to us the more
reasonable, that a principal ought not to retain the benefit of a
contract without assuming full responsibility for the means by
which the contract was induced; which is, after all, nothing
more nor less than a purely quasi-contractual obligation. And
there is plenty of authority for the latter view. See Reitman v.
Fiorillo,"where it was held that an innocent principal cannot
assert any rights or retain any benefits upon a contract when it
is procured by the fraud of his agent; and where an agent
effected a sale of land for his principal by false representations, without the authority or knowledge of the principal, the
latter was held liable for the fraud in the same manner as if
he had known or authorized it in Law v. Grant.9 The recent
Pennsylvania case of Shultheis v. Sellers'0 is in line with these
decisions. Here the defendant was the maker of a promissory
note which he had been induced to sign by the false representations of the agent of a publishing house as part consideration
for a set of books. The note was payable to the agent; and
had been endorsed to the plaintiff, who failed to establish the

' Pollock's Torts, 5th Ed., p. 29i.
'Peak v. Derry, L. R. I4 Ap. Cas. 54I.
'72

AtI. R. 74.

937 Wis. 548.
"0223

Pa.

513.
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fact that he held the note without knowledge of the fraud. It
was not alleged that the agent was an expert and knew that his
representations as to the character and quality of the books were
false, nor that the publishers authorized the agent to make the
representations. It was held, inter alia, that the publishers
could not affirm the action of the agent in making the sale and
not assume responsibility for his representations.
As for the liability of the agent under such circumstances,
both reason and authority are in accord with the proposition
that an agent is personally liable for false representations resulting in damage to others while acting within the apparent
scope of his authority, whether those representations were authorized by the principal or not. But in Wimple v. Patterson
the agent was held not liable, the Court holding that where an
agent, acting within the scope of his authority so as to bind
the principal honestly believes the representations made by him
to induce the purchaser to contract with his principal to be
true, to the damage of the purchaser, he is not liable either on
the contract or as for the tort. That he is not liable on the
contract is clear, for he was not a party to it; but whether he
is liable in tort for the deceit depends upon whether in a given
jurisdiction the scienter must be proved. The peculiarity of
Wimple v. Patterson lies in the fact it was not necessary to
prove the scienter to hold the principal either on the contract as
on a breach of warranty, or in tort for the deceit; whereas, in
the case of the agent, the scienter must be proved to hold him
liable in deceit.
G.H.B.

